Ethiopia: from GERD to Assab, from the Nile to the Red Sea, a painful history lesson

In recent days, various Italian newspapers have been talking about the GERD, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In most cases, they have done so from a technical perspective, describing its potential in economic and energy terms, and mentioning its construction by WeBuild, formerly Salini-Impregilo, an Italian giant in large infrastructure. Although the foreign affairs sections in Italy generally leave something to be desired, whatever the newspaper, this was not the case here; even with much of the mainstream press, the articles often contained very relevant considerations. In fact, no article, despite its “technicality,” could avoid mentioning the serious geopolitical trade-offs that the GERD inevitably entails with other countries in the Nile Valley, primarily Sudan and Egypt.

I say all this in passing to those, albeit few, who have mistakenly linked the GERD to the Mattei Plan, with which it actually has little to do: the former was initiated in 2011, while the latter was officially presented in January 2024, after two years of discussion. The Mattei Plan is underway in various African countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Ghana, Mauritania, Tanzania, Senegal, etc., in addition to Ethiopia itself; but in the case of the latter, its interventions are still rather limited for the moment, such as the Boye reclamation project and the redevelopment of the coffee supply chain, as well as other actions in healthcare, green energy, education, and digital technology. The major interventions are mainly seen in nations, such as Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, Eritrea, or even Ivory Coast or the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), etc., where political and financial stability are more or less favorable. In Ethiopia, the political and economic situation is unfortunately quite “volatile” at the moment, which does not attract investors, many of whom have suspended their activities; while the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which control a large part of its debt, after having promoted its financial destabilization, are now getting agitated, crying that it is unsustainable.

At the time the GERD work began in 2011, Ethiopia was still led by the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) of Meles Zenawi. Abiy Ahmed, at the head of the PP (Prosperity Party) and of Oromo ethnicity, came to power in 2018, immediately winning a Nobel Peace Prize for deciding to end the “neither war nor peace” situation that had pitted his country against Eritrea. In 1998, TPLF-led Ethiopia had attacked Eritrea in a war that lasted until 2000, when the two countries ceased hostilities with the Algiers Agreements. However, in the 18 subsequent years, TPLF-led Ethiopia had refused to accept the terms of the Agreements, continuing to occupy important border areas and engaging in recurring clashes with the Eritrean army, which was therefore forced into a state of perpetual mobilization. Abiy’s arrival unlocked the situation, setting the stage for a first path of regional integration that, involving not only Eritrea but also Djibouti and Somalia, seemed very promising. The outbreak of the secession war in 2020 in the northern Ethiopian state of Tigray (Ethiopia is a federal republic, albeit with an original and unique ethnic-based federalism), governed by the TPLF, interrupted that path with a new conflict that lasted until 2022.

After that conflict, however, everything changed: the Pretoria Agreements that were supposed to resolve it were not applied, either by the federal government of Abiy Ahmed or by the TPLF, and Addis Ababa began to rapidly change its regional positions. From a “rising actor” of multipolarism, it has returned to being a pawn of Western neocolonialism, and not only that: it is a BRICS member, certainly, but this does not mean it is a “counter-current” geopolitical actor, unaligned with the so-called Washington consensus like China or Russia (the same, after all, could be said for other BRICS actors, such as India with its good offices with Israel and its QUAD and IMEC initiatives with Washington, in an anti-Chinese function; or the United Arab Emirates, which pursue a similar policy. It’s a topic that partly falls outside the article, but it serves to clarify for those who, perhaps from social media readings, tend to imagine the BRICS as a kind of “anti-Western club” or even a “private property” of Moscow or Beijing), also because in the meantime it is being used by the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates for their dirty common political strategy from the Great Lakes to the Nile Valley, which is certainly not progressive. We’re talking about support for the RSF (Rapid Support Forces, the former Janjaweed) in Sudan, the separatism of Somaliland in Somalia, new and constant tensions with Eritrea for access to the sea, and last but not least, those with Sudan and Egypt over the GERD. I have already discussed these topics many times and do not want to repeat myself here, lengthening an already long article: those who want to know more should look for the ones already published, such as the penultimate one, precisely on the GERD.

The problems of the GERD do not lie so much in its technical nature, which divides environmentalists and climate change deniers, and so on with other political and especially social groups of that kind; because in a framework of regional harmony, its use could be easily regulated between Ethiopia and the other downstream states, namely Sudan and Egypt. After all, in Khartoum, where the White Nile and the Blue Nile meet, there are often serious floods and a coordinated management of the reservoir could also allow Sudan to better deal with them; but perhaps, to achieve such an advantage, the civil war that is tearing Sudan apart, and to be honest, now also Ethiopia, should first cease. For this to happen, Ethiopia would have to free itself from the control that the United States, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates have imposed on it, so that they can no longer use it as their battering ram in the region: it is not easy to imagine at the moment, even if Abiy’s regime is falling apart, day by day.

The GERD undoubtedly has potential for the development of the country and, consequently, also for the region, given that the sale of low-cost electricity would be advantageous not only for the Ethiopian economy but also for the Sudanese, Kenyan, and so on; but without having to get lost in great and emphatic anti-colonialist or “developmentalist” rhetoric. First of all, if we really want to talk about “anti-colonialism,” and perhaps also “Pan-Africanism,” we must then accept that countries of the same continent can finally sit down to discuss their common problems and interests, among themselves and without external interference; therefore, without thinking of appropriating other people’s lands, even presenting it as a right, as the government of Abiy is still doing by addressing Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea.

In over ten years, Ethiopia has not been able to provide even minimal documentation to Egypt and Sudan about the use and effective impact of the GERD, while in the meantime it continued to raise the levels of the basin with water from the Blue Nile. Cairo and Khartoum have an agreement for the exploitation of the Nile’s waters signed in 1959, a revision of the previous one from 1929; and its validity is recognized by the UN’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) according to the principle that treaties between states on water are equivalent to those on borders. The three countries could therefore have discussed it among themselves, agreeing with political and diplomatic tools, according to the principle that every issue concerning the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley, or the Great Lakes should always be addressed only by the countries that are part of them, among themselves, peacefully, without interference from others.

After all, there would even be specific intergovernmental authorities to do so: one of these is IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda), which, however, in this whole situation has been left aside, playing the usual role of a phantom body, of the typical intergovernmental family paralyzed by vetoes and sabotages that are only apparently internal. And, if there was no way to resolve the issue at the regional level, it could have been internationalized but always through diplomatic channels, by turning to the ICJ, the aforementioned UN International Court of Justice: it is always done to discuss borders, access to the sea as happened between Bolivia and Chile, and to obtain other political and territorial arbitrations; and for humanitarian issues, such as the South African complaint against Israel or the Sudanese one against the United Arab Emirates, etc.

Yet none of this has ever happened. Abiy’s government has preferred to proceed with its usual unilateralism, well aware that in international justice, before the ICJ, its claims would never be accepted; and it has thus preferred to continue threatening its neighbors, refusing them a dialogue. It did not turn to the ICJ for the issue of the use of the waters of the Blue Nile with Sudan and Egypt, but on the contrary, it fomented military tension against them; and even less did it do so to “obtain” access to the sea from Eritrea, in the form of a territorial cession of the Eritrean port of Assab, which of course no ICJ judge would ever approve. After all, claims are not rights; and no international tribunal, much less a UN one, would ever dream of equating the two.

Why does this happen? Why is this situation blocked? I have already briefly described part of the reasons in the previous paragraphs, while the others lie in the serious internal problems that Ethiopia has. I have also discussed this multiple times in my recent articles, for the benefit of those who want to delve deeper into the topic. Meanwhile, just to give a small update, while inflation continues to grow, eating away at the value of the birr, more and more soldiers and officers are mutinying from the Ethiopian Federal Army, many even fleeing to neighboring Eritrea. The populations and often even the authorities of the northern Ethiopian states of Tigray, Amhara, and Afar are carrying on the policy of brotherhood and good neighborliness, Tsimdo, with Eritrea: their populations do not want to obey a regime that intends to use them against Asmara and make their own territory a new war zone. The peoples of the region want peace, while Abiy would force them into war.

Abiy fears a coup d’état and for this reason he always appoints new generals: the list is now impressive. In a speech given just in recent days to the new generals, he addressed a blackmailing threat to them: to sacrifice themselves for the flag, otherwise they will be annihilated. There are those who shrewdly argue that by “flag,” Abiy actually means himself: the future will tell us. These new generals should be his loyalists, capable of defending him from the revolt of the Amhara and Oromo, whose FANO and OLA movements now control vast areas of the national territory, even near Addis Ababa: but among them could also be many of his future traitors.

Among the many new generals and officers, there are even some from the Ethiopian Navy, a force just reconstituted after its end for obvious reasons in 1993, when with the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia lost all access to the sea. The promise to return Ethiopia to the sea, according to Abiy, could save him from unpopularity and prolong his stay in power. Yes, but that military fleet, in the meantime, was defeated and sunk by the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) with Operation Fenkil in February 1990; and today it lies at the bottom of the sea. Antonio Gramsci said: “History teaches, but has no pupils.” Abiy’s dreams could soon turn into a nightmare: into a painful history lesson, which certainly the peoples of the region, unlike him, do not and did not need.