Aidarous Al Zubaidi, leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) militias—supported until a few days ago by the UAE against the Aden-based Presidential Council, the only internationally recognized Yemeni government backed by Saudi Arabia—fled Southern Yemen hours ago, seeking refuge in Abu Dhabi after a brief stopover in Berbera, Somaliland. At the last moment, Emirati authorities ordered him not to stop in Riyadh, fearing he might confess to the Saudis that he was not the true mastermind behind the recent terrorist acts in Hadhramaut (which triggered the Saudi reaction against the STC and UAE a few days ago, including the bombing of the port of Mukalla and an ultimatum to suspend their relations), but rather the mere executor of precise orders carried out under their own direction. After years of joint strategy with Israel from South Yemen to Somaliland, and from Sudan to other areas between Africa and the Middle East, the UAE now finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable regional predicament. Indeed, the UAE and Israel vastly underestimated the possibility that Riyadh might react, let alone with consequences so destructive to their plans. In just a few days, practically years of Israeli-Emirati labor to extend influence over Southern Yemen were overturned by a single bombardment and an ultimatum from Saudi authorities. Beyond underestimating the hypothesis of a Saudi reaction, the Emiratis and Israelis also overestimated their actual capacity for penetration in the region; now, their long and costly work is crumbling like a castle of sand or, if we prefer, evaporating like a deceptive desert mirage—a mirage of easy, neo-colonial style hegemonies.
Meanwhile, the parallel Israeli-Emirati efforts in Sudan and Somaliland are also destined to crumble further. The presidents of the two countries, Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, have met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, while Saudi diplomats are “pulling the ears” of President Trump and his staff, urging them to revise their policy of excessive “compliance” toward Israel and the UAE in the region. Strong pressure is mounting from multiple sides, including other regional and external actors whose words are very difficult for certain recipients to ignore. In Ethiopia, for instance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has landed. While at the African Union (headquartered in Addis Ababa) Wang Yi is presiding over the launch of the China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges—part of the FOCAC 2024-2027 plan—he will discuss the Somali-Somaliland issue with Ethiopia. This is in addition to existing infrastructure projects (such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, which has failed to meet cargo and passenger expectations and now appears further jeopardized by the Ethiopian government’s strained relations with Djibouti, Somalia, and Eritrea in its quest for direct sea access). Ethiopian interference in this matter, conducted alongside Israel and the UAE, is not of great benefit to regional stability, nor to anyone who has invested heavily in it thus far.
Subsequently, the Minister will travel to Mogadishu, Somalia—the first time for a Chinese diplomatic chief since the 1980s—to reaffirm full support for Somali political unity. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland puts at serious risk not only the stability of the Horn of Africa and the routes along the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, but could create dangerous precedents for the future: it is no coincidence that Taiwan immediately welcomed the Israeli move with great enthusiasm. Support for Somali unity is a priority for China, and for Somalia, it is a top-tier “gain” at a time when others, flouting international law, thought they could “reckon without the host” regarding its territories. At the UN Security Council, Chinese Ambassador Sun Lei, recalling that “Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia,” invited Israel to revoke its recognition to avoid “opening the door to further tensions.” Meanwhile, in Mogadishu, not only China but also Turkey and Egypt are strengthening their military presence.
The entry of major players like Saudi Arabia and China, preceded by others like Egypt, is the result of the chaos sown in the region by actors such as the UAE and Israel, who supported the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) in Sudan or the separatist government of Somaliland—held by the Isaaq clan and pivoting on the complicity of a local government like Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party (PP) in Ethiopia. Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki, during his recent meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince in December, emphasized Saudi Arabia’s absence from the region in the face of hegemonic appetites that were devastating it, and which would ultimately manifest as a mortal threat to Riyadh itself. Consequently, the forceful response that Riyadh is now launching from Southern Yemen to Sudan (creating a literal pincer at the center of which lie Somalia and Somaliland, where Riyadh equally supports Somali unity to expel the influence of Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv) can be read as a “compensation”—perhaps disproportionate but now necessary—for years of insufficient presence. It is a sort of “step up in quality” that also involves another major partner, Beijing, which Asmara pointedly referenced in an official statement as soon as news of the Israeli recognition of Somaliland became public.
For a long time, in this great chaos fueled by the UAE and Israel with Ethiopian support from Sudan to Somalia and Yemen, Asmara positioned itself as the sole bastion of stability. Through dense diplomatic work, it eventually succeeded in proving to the governments of countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia the underlying unity of a chaos that was only apparently “disordered” and endogenous in origin. Joint work against that orchestration now allows for it to be overturned, dismantling it piece by piece. For some time, for example, Asmara has carried out valuable work alongside the Sudanese government against the RSF: initially focused on diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, and later providing intelligence and military support. This expert and skillful work has grown over time, increasingly forcing the RSF to retreat to the advantage of the Sudanese Army (SAF). One might think of a parallel conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Sudan—the former flanked by the UAE and Israel, the latter by Egypt and Saudi Arabia—but in reality, this would be a misleading simplification for the benefit of certain Western narratives that lack insight into local contexts and proportions. What is actually at stake is the safeguarding of a vast region, from the Nile Valley to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, from an Israeli-Emirati led strategy of chaos that aims for its pulverization and the birth of new partially recognized states, from Darfur and Kordofan to Somaliland and Southern Yemen. It is undoubtedly a diabolical project, which a neo-colonial orchestration has worked on for years, but which today is crumbling like a sandcastle in a desert of hegemonic appetites that are out of step with history.
The great article argues that Israeli-UAE efforts to expand influence in Southern Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, and Somalia are collapsing after miscalculating local and regional resistance. Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt, and other actors are countering these moves, supporting sovereignty and stability, especially Somali unity. The piece frames the UAE-Israel strategy as a failing neo-colonial project, while highlighting the limits of external meddling and the rise of corrective regional powers. It provides a detailed geopolitical analysis but leans toward a strongly adversarial narrative. Thank you, Filippo!